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COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION USE RESTRICTIONS: APPLYING
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT DOCTRINE
JEFFREY A. GOLDBERG
There is often more to the purchase of a home than the mere acqui-
sition of ownership rights to a house and lot. Unwary purchasers may be
surprised to find that they have also enrolled in a community association
governing their neighborhood.I Exercising a broad range of powers over
its members 2 through the ability to impose restrictions on the use and
occupancy of the property, the association is formed by virtue of a re-
corded declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions. 3 The dec-
laration is the governing instrument for the association, providing the
groundwork for the operation of the association; establishing the rights,
benefits, and obligations of the members; and granting authority and
power to a board of managers elected by the members to regulate and
manage the property as a whole. Accepting a deed to a residence encum-
bered by such a declaration automatically imposes mandatory member-
ship in the association and subjects the purchaser to the obligations set
forth in the declaration. 4
One method of regulating the property is the imposition of restric-
tions on the members' use of the property. Use restrictions may appear
directly in the form of restrictive covenants in the recorded declaration
1. The term "community association" is used to designate residential housing characterized
by mandatory membership in a governing association. W. HYATr1, CONDOMINIUM AND HOME-
OWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW 10 (2d ed. 1988). A condomin-
ium is a form of separate ownership of an individual dwelling unit in fee simple and an undivided
interest as a tenant in common in the underlying fee and in the common elements (common spaces
and building). P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.01 (rev. ed. 1987)
[hereinafter CONDOMINUM LAW]. A homeowner association is a form of home ownership in which
the owner has a fee simple ownership of a lot and a membership interest in a homeowners associa-
tion which owns the common property. W. HYATT, supra, at 20. A cooperative apartment is a form
of housing in which a corporation has a fee simple ownership in the entire property and its stock-
holders enter into proprietary leases for an apartment in the building. P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN,
COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.01 (rev. ed. 1988). Although the differences in
these forms of ownership are significant, the policies and principles of use restriction by the gov-
erning boards are identical so that the discussion in this Note will be generally applicable to all of the
forms of residential community ownership. Commercial cooperative associations are beyond the
scope of this Note.
2. See Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 253 (1976).
3. For examples of such declarations, see CONDOMINIUM LAW, supra note 1, at app. C.
4. Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 693-94, 146 Cal. Rptr.
695, 699 (1978).
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and bylaws. Many declarations also grant to the board the power to
promulgate rules and regulations which govern both the use of the prop-
erty and the behavior of the members.5
Problems arise when a recalcitrant owner knowingly violates a use
restriction or openly rejects or challenges the board's authority to impose
the restriction. Enforcement of the use restriction then requires resort to
the courts.6 Courts are tempted to reexamine all of the policies, evi-
dence, and rationales behind a restriction and will often modify or re-
place the board's approach to enforcement with the court's own
solution.7 This process undermines the board's authority. There is a
need, therefore, for a standard of judicial review that will avoid second-
guessing, but at the same time safeguard the interests and rights of indi-
vidual owners from the majority's tyranny as represented by the board.
Judicial review and enforcement must balance the interest of the associa-
tion in having a relatively unfettered power to govern the community
against the interest of the individual in owning and residing on his prop-
erty without unnecessary and burdensome interference.
The courts have adopted an active role in reviewing the decisions
and actions of association boards. This Note will question the prevailing
assumption that the courts must necessarily intervene in the affairs of the
community association. This paper will begin by reviewing the three dif-
ferent standards of review applied by the courts. The next section will
evaluate and critique how each of these standards furthers the policy in-
terests underlying their application. The final section will propose an
assimilated standard which adopts a noninterventionist role for the
5. Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Some courts
have used differing approaches to enforcement of use restrictions depending on whether or not they
are in the declaration or are adopted as rules by the board. Id. at 639-40. However, the only distinc-
tion is that the declaration and bylaws are written by the developer and the prospective purchaser
has prior "notice" of the recorded restrictions. Rules and regulations can be created or modified by
the board any time after purchase. Since most buyers either never read the documents prior to
purchase or do not understand them, a better approach is to treat all the restrictions the same. See
Note, Condominium Rulemaking-Presumptions, Burdens and Abuses: A Call for Substantive Judi-
cial Review in Florida, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 219, 227-28 (1982); see also Thanasoulis v. Winston
Tower 200 Ass'n, 214 N.J. Super. 408, 423, 519 A.2d 911, 919 (1986) (Cohen, J., dissenting), rev'd,
110 N.J. 650, 542 A.2d 900 (1988) (following dissent). This Note focuses on the review of an associ-
ation board's attempt to enforce and apply the use restriction, regardless of whether the restriction
was written by the developer or by the board.
6. Although many declarations contain provisions granting self-help remedies to the board,
concern for potential liability probably restrains most associations from attempting to exercise such
remedies. However, one effective method of enforcement is for the board to levy a fine for an infrac-
tion of any association regulation, after giving notice and an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g.,
UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 3-102(a)(1 1) (1978). Nevertheless, failure to pay the fine would then
require enforcement by the courts.
7. See infra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
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courts while preserving the interests that the courts have heretofore at-
tempted to protect.
I. JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Each of the prevailing standards of review focuses on a different
concept of the community association. Since the association is essentially
a device for managing real property, some courts apply an equitable rea-
sonableness test in the same manner as if adjudicating any other restric-
tive covenant. Other courts seem to concentrate on the governmental
nature of an association and apply principles of constitutional law. Still
others emphasize the organization of an association as a corporate 'entity
and apply the law of corporate fiduciary duty. The strength or weakness
of these three approaches depends, in large part, upon the propriety of
exclusively characterizing a community association as a manager of real
property, a quasi-governmental entity, or a corporation.
A. Equitable Reasonableness Test
The most common standard of review is equitable reasonableness.
This test treats the governing documents of the association as any real
covenant running with the land. The use and occupancy restrictions,
and the grant of rule-making authority to the association, contained in
the recorded declaration are treated in accordance with the established
law of real property. The court will only enforce the restrictions if it
finds them to be reasonable. The test is commonly attributed to Hidden
Harbour Estates v. Norman,8 in which the court reviewed a rule adopted
by the board of directors of a condominium association prohibiting the
use of alcoholic beverages in its clubhouse and adjacent areas. Finding
that condominium unit owners form a democratic subsociety, the court
held that the board was empowered to adopt reasonable rules but not
arbitrary or capricious rules which bore no relationship to the unit own-
ers' health, happiness and enjoyment of life.9 The court in Hidden Har-
bour was reluctant to establish a uniform rule of reasonableness because
"each case must be considered upon the peculiar facts and circumstances
thereto appertaining.' 0
Adopting this approach, many courts evaluate use restrictions and
the board's creation or enforcement of such restrictions by questioning
8. 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The test is here designated as "equitable reasona-
bleness" to distinguish it from the constitutional reasonableness tests discussed below.
9. Id. at 182. The test is succinctly set forth by the court: "If a rule is reasonable the associa-
tion can adopt it; if not it cannot." Id.
10. Id.
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whether they are arbitrary or capricious. The application of this stan-
dard, however, has turned out to be very unpredictable.
The reasonableness test was explained further in Hidden Harbour
Estates v. Basso. 1 The court noted that the reasonableness requirement
was designed to fetter a board's discretion so that it can enact only those
rules reasonably related to the promotion of the health, happiness and
peace of mind of the unit owners. ' 2 Thus, the court rejected a condomin-
ium board's denial of a unit owner's request for permission to drill a
shallow water well. The court reasoned that the Board must allow any
use of the property by an owner unless it was "demonstrably antagonis-
tic" to the condominium association's objective of promoting the health,
happiness and peace of mind of the owners.13
On the other hand, in deciding whether a board acted arbitrarily or
capriciously, a court in one case has approved a board's denial of a unit
owner's request to replace a porch wire screen with glass jalousies be-
cause the "individual ought not be permitted to disrupt the integrity of
the common scheme through his desire for change, however laudable
that change might be."' 4 In another case, the court upheld the validity
of a condominium board's rules which severely limited unit rentals and
the occupancy rate, and which required the board's approval of the
transfer of the unit to guests. The court found that the rental and occu-
pancy of units are legitimate subjects of rulemaking, so that the rules
were valid and within the scope of the board's authority.1 5 Another
court found that a rule prohibiting dogs in a unit was reasonably consis-
tent with the board's authority to promote health, happiness and peace of
mind of the unit owners.' 6 Still another court held that a restriction
against dogs was reasonably consistent with the board's authority to pro-
mote the health, happiness and peace of mind of the unit owners. 17
A court in another case upheld an age restriction that both limited
occupancy of units to persons twelve years of age or older, and that re-
quired a couple who gave birth after the purchase of the unit to move
out.18 In another case, a court also upheld an age restriction limiting
11. 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
12. Id. at 640.
13. Id.
14. Sterling Village Condominium v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685, 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971).
15. Beachwood Villas Condominium v. Poor, 448 So. 2d 1143, 1144-45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
16. Johnson v. Keith, 368 Mass. 316, 331 N.E.2d 879 (1975).
17. Wilshire Condominium Ass'n v. Kohlbrand, 368 So. 2d 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
18. Constellation Condominium Ass'n v. Harrington, 467 So. 2d 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
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occupancy to persons eighteen years of age or older.' 9 The age restric-
tion was passed as an amendment to an association's bylaws after the
plaintiff had purchased the unit. In addition, the U.S. Housing and Ur-
ban Development (HUD) property report, issued before the plaintiff
purchased the unit, referred to the project as "family home units" 20 and
the purchase agreement emphasized the close proximity of schools and a
"fenced tot play area" 2' in the association. Nevertheless, the court
found the amendment to the bylaws to be a reasonable exercise of the
association's authority to prevent activity or conduct that might be a nui-
sance or annoyance to the residents.22 On the other hand, the similarly
retroactive application of an amendment to the bylaws of an association
that prohibited keeping dogs in a unit (except for dogs registered with the
association at the time of the amendment) was not permitted when a unit
owner's dog gave birth to puppies.23
Thus, the equitable reasonableness test permits the board to prohibit
buildings or improvements in some cases but not others; and to prohibit
rents, children, and pets in some cases but not others. The reasons for
the differences in outcome are not clear. Application of the reasonable-
ness test, with its emphasis on, and sensitivity to, evaluating facts and
circumstances of the particular case, does not establish a predictable
guideline for determining what use restrictions are enforceable.
Although steeped in the language of constitutional law, the equita-
ble reasonableness test probably derives from the modem law of re-
straints on the alienation of real property.24 According to established
law, a restriction on the use of real estate must be imposed for a just
reason, must be designed to protect the interests of the party in whose
favor it runs, and must be reasonable.25 Although the guiding principle
in the interpretation of restrictive covenants is the intent of the parties, 26
19. Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695
(1978).
20. Id. at 695, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
21. Id. at 696 n.10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 700 n.10.
22. Id. at 697-98, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
23. Winston Towers 200 Ass'n v. Saverio, 360 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
24. There has been speculation, however, that the reasonableness test has arisen out of a loose
analogy with the judicial review standards of governmental administrative agency rulemaking. See
generally Note, supra note 5, at 222-23; Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94
HARV. L. REV. 647, 662-63 (1981).
25. Le Febvre v. Osterndorf, 87 Wis. 2d 525, 533, 275 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979)
(injunction action to enforce prohibition against renting a unit without the prior consent of the
board).
26. Montoya v. Barreras, 81 N.M. 749, 751, 473 P.2d 363, 365 (1970) (restrictive covenants are
used to assure uniformity of development and used to give owners a degree of environmental stabil-
ity--owners have a right to rely on the restrictions so that effect will be given to the intention of the
19881
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their enforcement nevertheless is judged in terms of reasonableness. 27
The reasonableness test as it applies to both the board of a commu-
nity association and its power to create and enforce use restrictions re-
quires both substantive and procedural analysis.28  Substantively, the
court must ask whether the board has acted within the scope of its au-
thority (statutory or from the recorded documents), 29 and the court must
look to the restriction itself to ensure that it has a reasonable relationship
to the unit.30 Procedurally, the court must determine whether the own-
ers in question had adequate notice, and whether the board followed the
association's procedures for enforcing the restriction. The analysis of the
equitable reasonableness test therefore resembles the analysis of constitu-
tional review.
B. Constitutional Reasonableness Standard
A second approach to review, the constitutional reasonableness
standard, emphasizes the quasi-governmental nature of the community
association rather than its real property characteristics. The focus of the
analysis is, therefore, directed toward the protection of the property own-
ers' rights rather than the protection of the purposes of the association.
If a court finds that the association's enforcement of a use restriction is
the equivalent of state action, and if such a use restriction substantially
interferes with the constitutional rights of an owner, then the use restric-
tion will be unenforceable. 31
parties, after consideration of the language of the whole instrument and the surrounding
circumstances).
27. Flamingo Ranch Estates v. Sunshine Ranches Homeowners, 303 So. 2d 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974) (covenant permitting land developer to modify, alter, amend, or repeal restrictions at any
time was valid as long as it was exercised in a reasonable manner); see Holleman v. Mission Trace
Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (covenants permitting free use of common
property subject to parking restrictions made by board of "Planned Unit Developments" will be
enforced if reasonable).
28. Johnson v. Hobson, 505 A.2d 1313, 1317 (D.C. 1986) (regulation prohibiting unlicensed
vehicles and authorizing towing by police department was held not unreasonable).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1318.
31. See Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, 358 So. 2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979). If the Constitution is found applicable to community
associations, various restrictions and practices of associations would be subject to attack. Some
associations have voting systems that would violate the constitutional equal protection principle of
"one person--one vote." Association requirements that limit occupancy of units to members of a
particular class or age also may violate the equal protection clause. Requirements that authorize
associations to enter units or restrict the use of units may violate the right of privacy. Rules against
solicitation by religious groups could violate freedom of religion. Restrictions against signs, distribu-
tion of literature, or access by non-residents may infringe freedom of speech. Restrictions on leasing
and sale of units or architectural prohibitions may be considered the taking of property without just
compensation or due process. Rosenberry, The Application of the Federal and State Constitutions to
[Vol. 64:653
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Courts have found state action under three basic theories. The first
is the "judicial involvement" theory. Under the theory, as defined in
Shelley v. Kraemer,32 the court's involvement in the matter by enforcing
the restrictive covenant itself amounts to state action. The petitioners in
Shelley purchased a parcel of land, but a deed restriction prohibited con-
summation of the sale because the petitioners were black. Neighbors
sought to divest the petitioners of title. 33 The United States Supreme
Court found state action to be present because the restrictive covenants
could not have been enforced if not for the active intervention of the state
courts. 34
The second rationale is provided by the "state involvement" theory
as set forth in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 35 In that case, a pri-
vately owned, but highly regulated, utility was sued by a customer alleg-
ing that termination of her electric service was state action depriving her
of her property without due process. 36 The Court stated that in order to
find state action because of the extensive state regulation of the utility,
there must be a "sufficiently close nexus between the State and the chal-
lenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself."' 37 The Court held that in this
case heavy regulation by the State was not sufficient to constitute state
action. 38 Close interdependence between a private party and a state,
however, under some circumstances, can be sufficient to constitute par-
ticipation by the state in the private conduct. 39 Although the Court in
Jackson stated that regulation of private conduct alone is not ordinarily
sufficient to constitute state action, the Court based its decision on the
fact that the state regulation did not require the utility to shut off the
Condominiums, Cooperatives, and Planned Unit Developments, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 2-5
(1984).
32. 334 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1948).
33. Id. at 6-7. The neighbors sought an order of court to enforce the covenant by nullifying the
transfer and declaring the grantor or other person to be the owner of the property.
34. Id. at 19. The court noted that the case did not merely involve the State's refusal to inter-
fere with private individuals by leaving them free to discriminate, but rather that "the states have
made available to such individuals the full coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on
the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are
willing and financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell." Id The decision
in Shelley does not support the proposition that states must outlaw all private facts of racism when
judicial enforcement is sought. The state action in Shelley was the application of Missouri common
law that actively chose to enforce only racially restrictive covenants while refusing to enforce other
alienability restraints. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 260 (1985).
35. 419 U.S. "345 (1974).
36. Id. at 347-48.
37. Id. at 351.
38. Id. at 358-59.
39. See generally Rosenberry, supra note 3 1, at 11-20.
1988]
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electric source. 40 If the state regulation does compel or encourage the
private conduct, there may be state action.41
The third theory finding state action is the "functional equivalent"
theory formulated in Marsh v. Alabama.42 The Court found in Marsh
that a prohibition of the distribution of religious literature by a privately-
owned company town was state action because the town functioned like
a municipality.43 In order to sustain this theory, however, the private
property must be the functional equivalent of a municipality by provid-
ing a full range of public services such as fire, police, and medical serv-
ices, schools, and a business district. 44
These theories have been applied to community associations with
varying degrees of success. The judicial involvement theory's application
to a community association has had support. In Franklin v. White Egret
Condominium,41 for example, the Florida District Court of Appeal, con-
sidering the judicial involvement theory, ruled that when the association
requested enforcement of the restrictive covenant at issue,46 it invoked
the sovereign powers of the State to legitimize the restriction. Therefore,
the court had a "duty to carefully scrutinize [the] covenant with a view
toward forbidding its enforcement should it fail to pass constitutional
muster."' 47 An Arizona court has also indicated approval of the judicial
involvement theory, 48 although with some reservations. 49
The activities of community associations, although regulated, have
not generally been found to be state action through state involvement in
community associations.50 There is, however, considerable legislative in-
40. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974).
41. See Rosenberry, supra note 31, at 14-15.
42. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
43. Id. at 506-08.
44. Rosenberry, supra note 31, at 23.
45. 358 So. 2d 1084, 1089-91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
46. The association requested that the court set aside the transfer to the grantor's brother of a
one-half interest in a unit because of the declaration's prohibition of ownership of a unit by more
than one family, and because the grantee had a child under the age of 12 in violation of the rules. Id.
at 1085-86.
47. Id. at 1089.
48. Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974) (upholding prohibition against
persons under 21 years of age residing in mobile home subdivision).
49. The court distinguished between the stricter judicial standard applicable to an inherently
suspect classification of race in Shelley and the age classification system involved in Riley, which is a
classification subject to a lesser degree of judicial scrutiny. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 1610-18 (2d ed. 1988). The court noted the problem of examining the covenant
in terms of state objectives, which was not an issue in Shelley. Riley, 22 Ariz. App. at 228 n.2, 526
P.2d at 752 n.2. The standard of review was confusing because the State did not write the age-limit
restriction. Thus, it is not appropriate to examine the restriction in terms of the state's objective.
The restriction was privately drawn so it must be examined in terms of a permissible private objec-
tive. Id. at 228, 526 P. 2d at 752.
50. See Owens v. Tiber Island Condominium Ass'n, 373 A.2d 890, 895 (D.C. 1977) (rejected
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volvement in the creation, operation and management of condominium
associations which might lead to a finding of state involvement. 5' For
example, a statute that required the association to follow its declaration
and bylaws might be found to coerce the association into enforcing its
use restrictions. Thus, under the compulsion language of Jackson, such a
statute could establish the necessary relationship to the state.52
This state involvement theory was raised in Thanasoulis v. Winston
Tower 200 Association,53 in which the plaintiffs challenged an associa-
tion's parking rule. 54 The court refused to attribute the parking rule to
the State because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a "sufficiently close
nexus" between the State's regulation of condominiums and the parking
rule.55 The State regulation did not require passage of the rule and did
not affect the administration of the rule. 56
In contrast, a California court held invalid a restrictive covenant
containing age restrictions and limiting the number of persons in a resi-
dence to three because it violated the right of privacy under the Califor-
nia Constitution. 57 Here, the court found State action under the "state
involvement" theory noting that the City of Redland had entered into an
agreement with the developer to issue a special use permit in exchange
for the developer's act of placing the restrictions and including a provi-
sion that prohibited amendment without the approval of the city.58
The application of the functional equivalent theory of community
associations has sparked much interest. 59 One commentator has argued
that if an association takes on a government role by attempting to regu-
late areas beyond its scope of authority and thereby imposes itself on an
unconsenting public, the courts should subject it to constitutional scru-
tiny because "by acting like a government, the association will be treated
like a government." 6° Other commentators disagree, noting that an asso-
argument that association's assessment schedule based on unit owners' percentage of ownership was
state action).
51. See Rosenberry, supra note 31, at 11-13.
52. Id. at 14-15.
53. 214 N.J. Super. 408, 519 A.2d 911 (App. Div. 1986).
54. The rule increased the parking fee for tenants of nonresident owners but did not raise the
fee for resident owners. Id. at 410, 519 A.2d at 912.
55. Id. at 412, 519 A.2d at 913. Accord Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass'n, 502 So.
2d 1380, 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
56. Thanasoulis, 214 N.J. Super. at 412-13, 519 A.2d at 913.
57. Park Redlands Covenant Control Comm. v. Simon, 181 Cal. App. 3d 87, 226 Cal. Rptr.
199 (1986).
58. Id. at 99, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
59. See, e.g., Weakland, Condominium Associations: Living Under the Due Process Shadow, 13
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 297, 320-22 (1986).
60. Id. at 329.
19881
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ciation is inescapably private in every respect. The legal structure is cre-
ated by private developers at their private initiative, on private property,
and using their private money, and the property is then transferred to
private individuals. 61 The "municipal" attributes of an association that
so often give rise to the quasi-government label, such as private taxation
(assessments) and public services (street maintenance, snow removal and
recreational facilities) are not taken on in the same manner as municipal
services. 62 That is, municipal services are imposed by law and include a
vast range of services for the entire community, while the services pro-
vided by an association are limited and are not imposed by force of law.
Rather, the owners are acting in unison for the sake of convenience and
economic efficiency to obtain services they desire, or would have to ob-
tain anyway, as individual homeowners. 63
After a court determines that state action is present, it must next
determine the constitutionality of the use restriction by analyzing it in
terms of equal protection and both substantive and procedural due pro-
cess. In order for a use restriction to be substantively invalid, the court
must ascertain that fundamental property or liberty interests are being
infringed by the use restriction, and that such an infringement is not rea-
sonably related to the goals of the condominium or that the means to the
end is not the least restrictive of the owner's property and liberty inter-
ests. 64 The court applies a balancing test between the individual unit
owner's rights and the association's community goals. This analysis is
similar to the equitable reasonableness test in that the goals of the associ-
ation are balanced against the effect of the use restriction. However, the
constitutional standard places a greater emphasis on evaluating the im-
pact of the use restriction on the individual in an attempt to guard
against unduly oppressive restrictions.
Application of substantive due process analysis has led to unpredict-
able results. For example, a board's approval of the construction of a
second story on a unit was found to be an appropriation to the common
elements of the property rights of other unit owners, represented by the
air space occupied by the addition. 65 The assignment of parking spaces
61. See Reichman, supra note 2, at 255-56.
62. Contra Weakland, supra note 59, at 304. The definition of a municipal corporation is a
political subdivision created by the state, governed by an electoral body, and entrusted by the state
with many powers of self-government. A community association is often created by the state with
powers of self-government and is governed by an elected board of managers. Id. at 304-05.
63. See Reichman, supra note 2, at 259-60; see also Brock, 502 So. 2d at 1382 (homeowner's
association lacks a municipal character because the services provided supplement rather than replace
those provided by a municipality).
64. Weakland, supra note 59, at 310-11.
65. Makeever v. Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384, 609 P.2d 1084 (1980) (holding that the association had no
(Vol. 64:653
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to individual owners by a board was held not to be an unlawful taking of
property in Juno By The Sea North Condominium Association v. Manfre-
donia.66 The court found that the regulation was fair and made sense
under the circumstances. 67 In Monell v. Golfview Road Association,68 the
court found that construction of a speed bump in a private road was an
appropriation of the plaintiff's easement rights because the speed bump
substantially diminished the convenience of the roadway.69
The court must also analyze a use restriction in terms of procedural
due process. The court must determine whether a use restriction was
imposed after an owner received adequate notice of a hearing, whether
the hearing was fair and impartial, and whether the owner had an oppor-
tunity to be heard.70 An association may meet this requirement by hold-
ing a hearing to permit the owners to produce evidence and offer
arguments before the association imposes or enforces a use restriction.
There is some authority that procedural due process is satisfied if the
owner has constructive or actual notice of the restriction, the association
has made a reasonable demand for compliance with the restriction, and
notice of commencement of litigation and an opportunity to be heard is
given to the owner in the context of a judicial proceeding.7t
Many declarations provide for a thirty-day notice of default and a
subsequent ten-day notice of termination before a board can take legal
action to enforce either the declaration's use restrictions or its own
rules.72 It appears that the mailing of such notices would meet proce-
dural due process notice requirements, especially because no infringe-
ment of rights is enforced until after the safeguards of the judicial
proceeding are met.73 Finally, the courts must apply equal protection
analysis 74 to determine whether use restrictions discriminate among the
right to convert a portion of the common elements to the exclusive use and control of an apartment
owner).
66. 397 So. 2d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
67. Id. at 304-05. The alternative to the board's assignment of parking spaces was chaos. Id. at
305.
68. 359 So. 2d 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
69. Id. at 4.
70. Weakland, supra note 59, at 314.
71. Majestic View Condominium Ass'n v. Bolotin, 429 So. 2d 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
72. See Board of Managers of Village Square I Condominium Ass'n v. Amalgamated Trust &
Sav. Bank, 144 Ill. App. 3d 522, 531, 494 N.E.2d 1199, 1205 (1986).
73. Id. But see Breene v. Plaza Tower Ass'n, 310 N.W.2d 730, 734 (N.D. 1981). The court in
Breene ruled that a first right of refusal restriction on purchase or lease of units could not be en-
forced unless the owners had notice of the restriction by recording in the office of the registrar of
deeds, before they purchased the unit, because the owners had a statutory right to notice of a
restriction.
74. There are three different standards of review applied by the courts in equal protection deci-
sions; the rational relationship test is applied to economic legislation. The court analyzes only
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unit owners. In Riley v. Stoves,7 5 the Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed
a covenant in a mobile home subdivision restricting occupancy of a unit
to persons twenty-one years of age and older. The court upheld the cove-
nant because the "Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state to
treat all people identically. State action, even though discriminatory,
generally will not be held violative of the equal protection clause where it
can be shown that the classification bears some rational relationship to a
permissible state objective."' 76 Because the restriction was privately
drawn the court examined the private objective to determine if the re-
striction was a reasonable means to accomplish that objective. 77 The
court stated that the obvious purpose of the restriction preventing chil-
dren was to create a quiet and peaceful neighborhood.78 Age limitations,-
the court concluded, are not arbitrary.79 Similarly, a Massachusetts
court found that limiting to two the number of units owned by the same
person or entity was rationally related to the purpose of the association 0
because the restriction reasonably contributed to a stable population. 81
C. Business Judgment Doctrine
The third approach to judicial review of a board's enforcement of
use restrictions is the business judgment doctrine. Based on the corpo-
rate nature, rather than the real property or quasi-governmental charac-
teristics of the community association, the business judgment doctrine
arises out of the fiduciary duties owed by corporate directors to the cor-
poration and its shareholders.8 2 The fiduciary duty is twofold: 1) the
duty of loyalty, which prohibits faithlessness and self-dealing; and, 2) the
whether the discriminatory activity bears a rational relationship to the government purpose. The
strict scrutiny test is applied in cases involving a fundamental constitutional right or involving a
suspect classification such as race or national origin. The court will not accept the legislation unless
the government demonstrates a compelling need for the discriminatory action. The final test is an
intermediate test applied to classifications based on gender or citizenship, whereby the court analyzes
the activity in terms of whether the discriminatory classification bears a substantial relationship to
an important governmental objective. See generally R. ROTUNDA, J. NOVAK & J. YOUNG, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 4 (1986).
75. 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974).
76. Id. at 228, 526 P.2d at 751-52.
77. Id. at 228-29, 526 P.2d at 752.
78. Id. at 229, 526 P.2d at 753.
79. The court stated that age is not a suspect class. Therefore, the heightened review by the
court of strict scrutiny is not necessary. Id. at 228 n.2, 526 P.2d at 752 n.2. However, the federal
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (effective March 12, 1989), Pub. L. 100-430 (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619), renders unlawful most association restrictions on occupancy
based on age.
80. Franklin v. Spadafora, 388 Mass. 764, 447 N.E.2d 1244 (1983) (the court avoided deciding
whether amendment to bylaws involved state action),
81. Id. at 775, 447 N.E.2d at 1250.
82. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE I (2d ed. 1988).
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duty of care, which requires the exercise of care that an ordinarily pru-
dent person would follow under similar circumstances.8 3
The business judgment doctrine is a tool of judicial review for deter-
mining whether the directors' fiduciary duties have been met.84
Although commonly considered as a defensive shield to protect directors
from liability arising out of their decisions when sued by the stockhold-
ers, the doctrine is actually a test for judicial review of corporate deci-
sions which will shield a decision from challenge unless impropriety is
demonstrated."5 There are four elements of the doctrine, presumed to be
satisfied unless rebutted by the challenger of the decision. All four ele-
ments must be present to shield corporate decisions from judicial scru-
tiny.8 6 The first element is that the decision must be a business decision.
Inaction is not protected unless a decision was exercised to refrain from
acting. 87 The second element is disinterestedness and good faith. The
directors must not be acting out of any personal interest, self-dealing, or
other improper purpose.88 The third element is informed decision. The
directors' action must demonstrate an informed exercise of business judg-
ment or it will not be protected.8 9 The fourth element is rational business
purpose. Even if the other three elements are satisfied, this element pre-
cludes the directors from acting with a reckless indifference to the affairs
of the corporation. 90
83. Id. The stockholders grant to the directors their power of control over the business. The
directors must carry out their power of control and management for the purposes for which the
corporation was organized. See D. BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL 50-51
(1986).
84. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 82, at 3.
85. Id. A useful distinction can be made between the business judgment rule and the business
judgment doctrine-the former refers to action against the directors for damages and the latter refers
to actions against the decisions. See Hinsey, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's
Corporate Governance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609,
611-12 (1984). For the purpose of this Note, "doctrine" will be used for describing the standard of
judicial review for enforcement of association use restrictions even though the distinction has not
been universally adopted.
86. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980). Once the challenger dem-
onstrates that self-dealing, fraud, or bad faith is involved, the burden shifts to the director to prove
that the action was fair and reasonable. Id.
87. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (stockholder derivative action challenging
compensation terms and loans made to corporation's director).
88. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 138, 167, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939). Any gain or advantage
acquired by a director in violation of his duty of loyalty is treated as being held in trust for the
benefit of the corporation regardless of whether actual injury is caused to the corporation. For
purposes of public policy, a director may not profit from a breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
89. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). Fiduciary duty requires more than
the absence of good faith. A director must act in an informed and deliberate manner. There is an
affirmative duty of care to assess critically all of the information under the circumstances. Id. at 872-
73.
90. See Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 1973). Shareholders of West-
em Union challenged a merger with National Sharedata Corporation (NSC) alleging that the plan
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The business judgment doctrine has been applied to community as-
sociations in several instances. 91 In Rywalt v. Writer Corp.,92 the associa-
tion of owners in a subdivision was sued by property owners to enjoin the
association from constructing a tennis court on common property in the
vicinity of their lots. 93 The trial court found that the board had kept
incomplete minutes of meetings; had used the annual meeting of mem-
bers only for electing directors; had held closed board meetings; had
failed to submit the tennis court plan to its architectural control commit-
tee; had failed to place greater priority upon drainage problems and
camper and boat parking; had inadequately polled its members regarding
the location of the tennis court; and had failed to poll any of the members
with respect to the need for a new tennis court. 94 Thus, the trial court
concluded that the board had acted arbitrarily and capriciously and en-
tered an order enjoining construction of the tennis court. 95 The Colo-
rado Court of Appeals dissolved the injunction and adopted the business
judgment doctrine:
The good faith acts of directors of profit or non-profit corporations
which are within the powers of the corporation and within the exercise
of an honest business judgment are valid. Courts will not, at the in-
stance of stockholders or otherwise, interfere with or regulate the con-
duct of the directors in the reasonable and honest exercise of their
judgment and duties.96
The Superior Court of New Jersey also applied the business judg-
ment doctrine in an action against a condominium association question-
ing its right to assert a lien against units of owners who failed to pay their
was designed by the directors to maintain control of the corporation, and that Western Union was
paying an inflated price for NSC's stock. Id. at 905-06. Western Union claimed that the deal was
part of a long-term business plan for expansion into computer information services. Id. at 907. The
court held that the board was entitled to a presumption of good faith attributed to a rational business
purpose. Id. at 909.
91. See, e.g., Schwarzmann v. Association of Apartment Owners, 33 Wash. App. 397, 655 P.2d
1177 (1982), in which the court stated that "[l]ike their corporate counterparts, condominium direc-
tors have a fiduciary responsibility to exercise ordinary care in performing their duties and are re-
quired to act reasonably and in good faith .... Absent a showing of fraud, dishonesty, or
incompetence, it is not the court's job to second-guess the actions of directors." Id. at 403, 655 P.2d
at 1181 (citation omitted).
92. 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974).
93. Id. at 335-36, 526 P.2d at 316. The plaintiffs alleged that the decision to build the tennis
court was not only beyond the scope of the authority of the board, but was also an arbitrary and
capricious action. The plaintiffs also alleged that construction of the tennis court would constitute
unreasonable interference with their view, their access to other common property, and would be an
unreasonable invasion of their privacy.
94. Id. at 336, 526 P.2d at 317. The governing documents of the association, however, did not
contain provisions specifying the conduct of board meetings or membership meetings and did not
require the board to act in the manner that the trial court apparently required.
95. Id. The funds for the project were provided by the developer of the subdivision. As a
result, there was no issue concerning the right of the board to expend funds for the project.
96. Id. at 337, 526 P.2d at 317.
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share of a special assessment. In Papalexiou v. Tower West Condomin-
ium, 97 the court refused to review the board's action of levying an emer-
gency special assessment. 98 The court held that no demonstration of lack
of good faith, self-dealing, dishonesty or incompetency was made, and
determined that the board had demonstrated, by its deliberate actions
and consideration of all of the possibilities, "its good faith intent to act
within the scope of its authority and to do what was necessary in the best
interest of all concerned." 99
New Jersey's business judgment doctrine was clarified in Thanasou-
lis v. Winston Tower 200 Association.100 An owner challenged a rule
adopted by the board which increased the parking fee for tenants of non-
resident owners, claiming it unfairly and unreasonably discriminated
against nonresident owners.' 0 ' The court limited the scope of its inquiry
to two questions. First, it asked whether the board's action was author-
ized by statute or its governing documents and then whether the action
was fraudulent, self-dealing, or unconscionable. 0 2 This two-part test
clarified the manner of determining whether a board acts with good faith
intent. The nonresident owners might have considered the board's action
as hostile to them, but the court's determination of good faith did not
include subjective considerations.
In Illinois, the business judgment doctrine was applied in Yorkshire
Village Community Association v. Sweasy.103 The owner challenged the
board's interpretation of a restriction requiring board approval of any
structure, alleging that a flower box is not a structure. The court held
that the association is entitled to interpret its own declaration and
restrictions. 104
The business judgment doctrine is suited to thwarting the subjective
gripes of an owner who merely does not agree with the decision of the
97. 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (Ch. Div. 1979).
98. Id. at 527, 401 A.2d at 286. The board passed a special assessment of $100,000 to pay for
unpaid bills from vendors and suppliers, a management fee, fuel and electricity bills, and extensive
repair to the building's air conditioning, heating and fire systems. Id. at 520-24, 401 A.2d at 282-84.
99. Id. at 529, 401 A.2d at 286. The court noted that the financial problems of the association
were inherited from its predecessors, and that the board had carefully weighed all of the alternatives
and sought legal advice before reaching its decision.
100. 214 N.J. Super. 408, 519 A.2d 911 (App. Div. 1986), rev'd, 110 N.J. 650, 542 A.2d 900
(1988).
101. Id. at 410, 519 A.2d at 912.
102. Id. at 411, 519 A.2d at 912.
103. 170 Ill. App. 3d 155, 524 N.E.2d 237 (1988).
104. Id. at 159, 524 N.E.2d at 239. The court then went on to discuss the merits of the board's
interpretation of the word "structure" and found that a flower box was the type of object for which
the architectural control restrictions were designed. Id. at 160-61, 524 N.E.2d at 240.
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board. One of the ways it accomplishes this is by placing the burden of
proof upon the challenger of the board's decision.
For example, the court in Dockside Association v. Detyens 05 held
that the burden of demonstrating a board's lack of good faith, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, falls upon the challenger of the board ac-
tion. 0 6 The rationale behind the business judgment doctrine is that the
directors need broad discretion in taking actions. Judicial second-guess-
ing is counter-productive and is something the courts are not competent
to carry out successfully. 0 7 To avoid this problem, the doctrine creates a
rebuttable presumption that the directors have acted in good faith, on an
informed basis, and in the honest belief that the action was taken in the
best interests of the corporation. 08
The application of this doctrine can be illustrated by a common ex-
ample. Many associations have restrictions against the conduct of a busi-
ness enterprise in the units. A parent who baby-sits a number of children
may not consider this activity as a day care business. The conduct in the
home is arguably no different than the private activity normally occur-
ring in any large family-a number of children playing, eating, and sleep-
ing in the unit. Yet, the association might consider that the activity
results in profit, causes daily business traffic as parents come in and out
of the unit, and creates increased noise, maintenance, and insurance
problems. Thus, the association could appropriately decide that the
owner must cease this business activity.1'9 The owner might resent this
"intrusion" by the board. The individual owner's challenge would be
properly blocked by the business judgment doctrine unless the owner first
demonstrated that the directors acted in violation of their fiduciary duty.
Once the presumption of good faith action is overcome, then the burden
would shift to the board which would have to defend its actions. How-
ever, if the owner could not show bad faith, the board's authority would
remain intact. In a jurisdiction that does not follow the business judg-
ment doctrine, however, the court would review the circumstances, his-
tory, and factual details surrounding the decision of the board and then
105. 291 S.C. 214, 352 S.E.2d 714 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 294 S.C. 86, 362 S.E.2d 874
(1987).
106. Id. at 217, 352 S.E.2d at 716.
107. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 82, at 5-6; illustrative of this hands-off
approach is the Illinois Appellate Court case which left the discretion to operate a major league
baseball team with its directors. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 111. App. 2d 173, 181, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780
(1968) (stockholders sued directors of corporation which owned the Chicago Cubs alleging misman-
agement in relation to decision not to install lights in Wrigley Field).
108. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
109. See Board of Managers of Village Square Condominium Ass'n v. Amalgamated Trust &
Say. Bank, 144 Ill. App. 3d 522, 494 N.E.2d 1199 (1986).
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decide for itself whether baby-sitting is a prohibited business. Following
this latter approach, the board's decision is too vulnerable to judicial sec-
ond-guessing.
II. POLICY INTERESTS UNDERLYING JUDICIAL REVIEW
Three major approaches to judicial review of community association
use restrictions have been discussed: the equitable reasonableness test
based on the equitable considerations of the law of restraints on the alien-
ation of real property; the constitutional reasonableness standard based
on the notion of the association as a private quasi-government and on the
prevailing theories of state action in private situations; and the business
judgment doctrine, borrowed from corporate law. All three of these ap-
proaches have common themes and similar purposes.1 0 This Note will
now identify the underlying policies of these standards and evaluate how
well these standards serve the policy interests which they were designed
to further.
A. Preventing Abuse of Power-The Individual Interest
In the cases involving community association use restrictions, the
prevention of abuse of power is the central theme of judicial review. The
power of a community association's board is enormous. Architectural
control committees, for example, have nearly unlimited discretion to ap-
prove or reject even the smallest details of the property's appearance,
from the color of the paint to the size of the garage."' Association
"house rules" regulate a wide spectrum of activities, including the
number of occupants living in a unit, the volume of playing music, hours
for social gatherings, social room activities, storage of property, garbage
storage and removal, use of patio furniture and barbecues, swimming
pool and tennis court use, rental of units, vehicle parking, and ownership
of pets." 2 Some rules and regulations even govern such matters as the
frequency of flushing the toilet in the unit and the kind of soap used in
owners' dishwashers. " 3 The broad scope of a board's asserted authority
110. See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
111. Reichman, supra note 2, at 269-70.
112. The examples listed are from a comprehensive set of rules and regulations, prepared by
Marshall N. Dickler, Ltd. (1988), commonly used by condominium associations in the Chicago area.
See generally Note, Promulgation and Enforcement of House Rules, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1132
(1974).
113. The following are examples of such rules:
When a resident plans to be away from his or her apartment for some length of time, the
Management Office should be informed. It is advisable when planning a prolonged absence
to arrange with a neighbor or friend to flush the toilet every two weeks. The water seal in
the toilet may be sucked out or evaporate permitting the entrance of sewage gases and
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over the conduct of an individual owner is so extensive that the potential
for harassment and malicious abuse of power is great.11 4 Furthermore,
the inability to determine precisely what activity an individual is permit-
ted to do in his own home creates a puzzling sense of helpless
vulnerability.
The potential for abuse includes: economic exploitation of some
homeowners by the majority;1 5 malicious actions directed toward spe-
cific individuals;" 6 taking of bribes for special favors;" 7 harassment of
"undesirables;" ' "1 8 manipulating the assessment system to eliminate the
low-income population;" 9 coercive imposition of political, economic, or
religious principles;' 20 and establishment of "illiberal" private govern-
causing possible foul odors in the apartment. Water should also be run in the sink, lava-
tory, bath and shower for a short time to maintain the water seals in their drains.
Dishwashing machines may be operated in a unit but the detergent used must be of the
low-sudsing type specifically intended for use in an automatic dishwasher. High-foaming
type washing compounds commonly used with open dishpans are not acceptable. Some
low-sudsing detergents, suitable for automatic dishwashers are Dishwasher All, Electrosol,
Finish, Palmolive Crystal-Clear, Calgonite, Cascade, etc. Brand selection is for the user
within the restriction that a low-sudsing detergent be used. Any overflow will be consid-
ered to have been caused by the act or neglect of the owner/tenant. The owner will be held
responsible for any damage.
114. Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Ass'n, 142 Cal. App. 3d 642, 651, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209, 214
(1983) (challenge of architectural control committee's arbitrary approval of fence).
115. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1532 (1982). A
classic example of this problem occurs in phased developments. The developer builds the subdivi-
sion in phases over several years. By the time the later phase is occupied, the earlier phases may
require substantial repair and structural replacement work at great expense. The owners of the new
units may find themselves subsidizing the rehabilitation of the older homes owned by their neighbors
in the association who have levied significantly high assessments to pay for the work. Economic
exploitation does not always occur at the hands of the majority. In Barclay v. Deveau, 11 Mass.
App. Ct. 236, 415 N.E.2d 239 (1981), vacated, 384 Mass. 676, 429 N.E.2d 323 (1981), the developer
maintained control over the board of a community association even after a majority of the units had
been sold to the individual members. The developer-controlled board raised the assessments by 38
percent against the wishes of the majority of the members.
116. See Note, supra note 5, at 231. Since the board of a community association is elected by the
majority of the members, the board is naturally not immune from political pressure which can lead
to the harassment of individuals who have opposed the actions of those in power. Since members of
a community association board are generally not compensated for the work they perform on behalf
of the association, the incentive for serving on the board for some may be the opportunity to wield
power over their neighbors.
117. Reichman, supra note 2, at 275.
118. Id. Enforcement of use restrictions against certain classes of members may be particularly
vigorous if the majority of the members perceive that the class possesses undesirable characteristics.
For example, while cooking odors are normally tolerated, the cooking smell of certain ethnic foods
may be considered offensive to other members so that an attempt will be made to prohibit the crea-
tion of such odors in a building.
119. Id. By adopting a particularly ambitious budget, or by passing a sudden special assessment,
the wealthier homeowners can force low-income owners to sell their units and leave the association.
120. Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472, 473-74 (1985).
One useful method of insuring uniformity of the members to a particular standard established by an
association is the exercise of a right of first refusal by the board. Typically, notice of a sale or lease of
a unit must be given to the board by the proposed seller. The board will have thirty days to buy or
lease the unit on the same terms as the prospective transaction and thereby prevent the sale or lease
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mental systems which renounce basic constitutional freedoms' 2' and sub-
ject homeowners to surveillance and intimidation in their own homes. 22
The courts have acted out of concern about this great potential for
abuse. In River Terrace Condominium Association v. Lewis, 23 the associ-
ation sought an injunction to obtain access to a unit to spray insecticides
for exterminating cockroaches. The right of an association to do this is
not normally questioned, considering the obvious health hazard posed by
cockroach infestation. The unit owner argued that the residue of the
insecticide was dangerous to her health and claimed that her dog had
died a few years before because of an excess of phenols in the dog's sys-
tem from past sprayings. Upholding the board's decision to enter the
unit, the court engaged in an exhaustive inquiry of the hazards of cock-
roach infestation, the habits of cockroach migration, the safety of the
insecticides used, and the nondiscriminatory manner of the board's car-
rying out its decision. The court concluded that the board acted reason-
ably and in good faith, 124 but only after the court carefully sought to
establish that the need for spraying cockroaches was reasonable in appli-
cation and not excessive or injurious to the health of the occupants.125
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals specifically stated the
policy underlying judicial review in Johnson v. Hobson. 26 After ac-
knowledging the broad authority granted to the board to regulate the
property, the court noted that its equitable power to review the actions of
the board is exercised to limit and restrain the power of the board. 127 To
do this, the court said a rule will be scrutinized to determine whether the
board had the legal power to enact it, whether the rule had a relationship
to the health and happiness of the owners, whether the rule affected cer-
tain unit owners unfairly or disproportionately, whether the owners had
adequate notice of the rule, and whether the procedures of the associa-
of a unit to an individual whom the board deems to be undesirable. This effectively prevents non-
conforming and dissenting members from joining the association and perpetuates the ideological
standard established for the association.
121. Id. at 473-75. An "illiberal" community "repudiate[s] norms embodied in traditional civil
rights." Id. at 473. An argument could be made that extreme religious or political factions ought to
have the right to create a community in which their ideological views are enforced. However, such
illiberal communities are difficult to justify when their ideology conflicts with the traditional values
of the community.
122. Id. at 487. It should be noted, however, that the average community association in the
United States generally does not regulate the conduct of the members inside of their units, except
under limited circumstances. Nevertheless, the potential for greater abuse inarguably exists.
123. 33 Ohio App. 3d 52, 514 N.E.2d 732 (1986).
124. Id. at 58, 514 N.E.2d at 738.
125. Id. Considering that control of cockroach infestation is such an obviously necessary course
of action, the court's careful analysis of the situation is surprising.
126. 505 A.2d 1313 (D.C. 1986).
127. Id. at 1317.
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tion were followed in enacting the rule. 128
In passing on a board's enforcement of a restriction against commer-
cial baby-sitting in a unit, the Illinois court in Board of Managers of Vil-
lage Square I Condominium Association v. Amalgamated Trust & Savings
Bank,1 29 concentrated on the board's fiduciary duty. The court held that
the proper exercise of such duty required strict compliance with the asso-
ciation's declaration and bylaws, and the procedures set forth therein
which govern board actions.130 Therefore, the policy of the court was
strictly to limit the board to the exercise of powers specifically granted to
the association, as a way of preventing potential abuse. In Hidden Har-
bour Estates v. Basso,'3' the court noted its function to fetter the discre-
tion of the board and stated in strong terms that the board's obligation
was to permit any use of the property unless it was antagonistic to the
legitimate objectives of the association.'3 2
In summary, the courts recognize the vast potential for abuse of
power by a community association due to the broad powers available to a
board. The decisions of the courts reflect a concern that individuals must
not be unduly harmed by the exercise of the majority's power. In review-
ing use restrictions, the courts attempt to limit the authority of the board
whenever such authority might threaten the freedom or well-being of the
individual. The courts uphold the board's authority when possible, but
only after careful deliberation to guard against any threat to the individu-
als concerned.
B. Promoting Cooperative Living-The Collective Interest
The interest in safeguarding individuals from the potential tyranny
and corruption of the board is indisputably a powerful one. There is also
a significant interest in protecting the condominium association and the
majority of unit owners from the excesses of individuals.
The following statement taken from Hidden Harbour Estates v. Nor-
man 133 is widely quoted to support the right of a community association
to regulate its members:
It appears to us that inherent in the condominium concept is the prin-
ciple that to promote the health, happiness, and peace of mind of the
majority of the unit owners since they are living in such close proxim-
ity and using facilities in common, each unit owner must give up a
128. Id. at 1317-19.
129. 144 I11. App. 3d 522, 494 N.E.2d 1199 (1986).
130. Id. at 529-30, 494 N.E.2d at 1204.
131. 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
132. Id. at 640.
133. 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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certain degree of freedom of choice which he mightotherwise enjoy in
separate, privately owned property. Condominium unit owners com-
prise a little democratic sub society of necessity more restrictive as it
pertains to use of condominium property than may be existent outside
the condominium organization.' 3
4
The very purpose of a community association is to establish a governing
body which will take on the burdensome and vital task of management of
the property for the benefit of the owners. 1 3 5 The entire group of owners
cannot meet, gather information, plan, formulate policies, review the cir-
cumstances and adopt management decisions every time a problem
arises.136 One commentator has noted that multiple ownership of build-
ings, such as modern community associations, flourished for a time dur-
ing the Middle Ages in the cities of Europe. Multiple ownership was
abandoned, however, because of the disputes among owners arising out
of a lack of governing rules.137 Cooperative home ownership vitally
needs a governing board with broad discretionary power to maintain,
preserve, and control the property and to protect the rights and interests
of all owners.
Enforcement of a community association's use restrictions is vital to
the protection of the interests of owners for a stable planned environ-
ment. 38 Many owners depend upon the integrity of the communities.
They require that the community remain stable and that the members of
the community retain control over their living arrangements. 39 The en-
forcement of use restrictions protects the property from deteriorating and
from decreasing in value, enhances the desirability of living in the unit,
provides personal security, avoids property damage, and maintains an
essential harmony and attractiveness for both the economic and personal
well-being of the owners.
C. Balancing the Interests
Judicial review ultimately aims to balance the interests of the major-
ity of homeowners in stability, economic efficiency, and the quiet enjoy-
ment of their property with the individual homeowner's interests in
enjoying the prerogatives of home ownership, in living free of coercion
and harassment, and in being protected from corruption and the mali-
cious exercise of authority. The equitable reasonableness and constitu-
134. Id. at 181-82.
135. See P. KEHOE, COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUMS 34-35 (1974).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 6.
138. Note, supra note 24, at 652-53.
139. Ellickson, supra note 115; at 1527.
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tional reasonable tests attempt to strike this balance.140
However, a critical look at the reasonableness standards for judicial
review demonstrates that, rather than achieving a balance of interests,
the test actually undermines both interests. Reasonableness review un-
dervalues the consensual grant of authority to the board, ignores the
unique private contractual purposes of the cooperative living arrange-
ment, and incorrectly invalidates association decisions on the basis of ex-
traneous standards. 41 The reasonableness review results in the court's
substitution of its own concepts of behavior and condominium operation
for the board's exercise of discretion.142 The end result undermines the
authority of the association since its every decision can be made subject
to second-guessing.
For example, if an owner is merely dissatisfied with a particular de-
cision, the matter can be completely reopened before the court. After the
court reexamines every one of the facts and the underlying rationales for
the board's decision, its relatively detached and uninformed perspective
may cause the court to view the circumstances differently. Therefore, the
owner may be granted relief from the decision. One result may be that
the majority of the association members who live in the condominium
and are intimately familiar with the particular circumstances and
problems of the association would be deprived of authority over their
property by a judge who never may have seen the property. Further-
more, uncertainty and confusion would prevail within the association as
the homeowners attempted to operate and manage the property with an
ineffective governing authority 43 and with the prospect of having every
decision questioned and overturned.
The constitutional reasonableness standard attempts to establish a
framework for the reasonableness test in order to achieve uniformity and
the balancing of interests. Constitutional law is concerned precisely with
140. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
141. See Ellickson, supra note 115, at 1530. The reasonableness standard is viewed by some
judges as an invitation to undertake a cost-benefit analysis, which allows the decision of the board to
be judged by general societal standards rather than in terms of its consonance with the purpose of
the association. Id.
142. Weakland, supra note 59, at 298.
143. See id. Weakland criticizes the results of the reasonableness test as follows:
One obvious problem created by the rule of reasonableness as a legal concept is the uncer-
tainty arising from these case by case applications of the rule. Condominium unit owner
associations rarely can be absolutely sure that their actions will be viewed as reasonable by
the court. Attorneys specializing in condominium law are continually frustrated by their
inability to counsel their clients with certainty and confidence. In addition, the unit owner,
whose fighting cause may be to plant tomatoes in his limited common area ... often has
only the vague and ethereal rule of reasonableness as guardian of his property rights.
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achieving a kind of necessary balance between the rights of the state and
of the individual. However, a close look at this approach also demon-
strates that it, in practice, undermines both interests.
Community associations are private governing bodies. The essential
difference between a community association and a governmental author-
ity is the voluntary nature of the association. Although in a broad sense
the heart of public democratic government is the consent of the gov-
erned, public government is an imperfectly voluntary authority. 144 Pub-
lic government is coercive, while the community association is voluntary
in the purest sense. No one is ever forced to accept ownership of a unit
in an association. Thus, the forces of the market naturally cause associa-
tions to safeguard members from coercive activity. If associations were
to become coercive in the sense that a public government is, the demand
for the property, and therefore its value in the marketplace, would pre-
sumably decrease. 45 Thus, the process of safeguards in an association is
self-regulating.
Another problem with the constitutional reasonableness test is the
essential failure of the analogy between public and private government.
Constitutional tests require an evaluation of the public interest being
served by the regulation under review. 146 The public interest is not read-
ily apparent in the context of a community association. 147 There are a
myriad of conflicting private interests. For example, an association may
consist of resident unit owners, nonresident owners, investors, mortgage
companies, lessees, and contract purchasers. The inherent paradox of
applying constitutional standards to an essentially private housing ar-
rangement results in the protection of some owners' civil rights at the
expense of the rights of other owners. In concurring with a California
appellate court decision applying constitutional tests to a community as-
sociation, Judge Kaufman stated:
[W]hile I am bound by the decisions of the California Supreme Court
prohibiting age discrimination in housing, I find those decisions legally
and practically inane. They invoke First Amendment guarantees, free-
dom of association, to strike down age limitations, failing to recognize
that in so doing they infringe to the same extent the same constitu-
tional right, the freedom of association, of the other owners, not to
mention their reasonable expectations, property rights and their right
freely to enter into binding contracts. The rights overlooked are at
144. See Ellickson, supra note 115, at 1523-24.
145. Id. at 1524-26. But see Note, supra note 120, at 481-83, in which the concepts of consent
are criticized as self-enslavement and democratic suicide. The freedom to consent to the abandon-
ment of one's freedom is no freedom at all. Id. at 480-81.
146. See L. TRIBE, supra note 49, at 1454.
147. See Rosenberry, supra note 31, at 28.
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least as significant and as sacrosanct as the rights of those for whom
our high court in its paternalistic wisdom is so solicitous.' 48
In order to apply constitutional principles properly in a community asso-
ciation setting, the court must identify and balance the private inter-
ests,' 49 which brings the inquiry back to the equitable basis of the
reasonableness test with its attendant judicial second-guessing.
The reasonableness tests attempt, but fail, to achieve a balance of the
interests of the association with the interests of individual owners.
Rather than serving these interests, the courts undermine both. The as-
sociation's attempt to exercise control and enhance the value and desira-
bility of the association is undermined by the uncertainty of which use
restrictions will be enforced. Similarly, an owner legitimately faced with
an abuse of power by a malicious or overreaching board is not certain
whether in the court's discretion the malicious acts of the board might
seem reasonable under the circumstances.
The community association's purpose is to enhance the value, desir-
ability and attractiveness of the community by managing the affairs of
the association, to provide for maintenance and repair, and to formulate
administrative and operative policies on behalf of all the unit owners.
The owners delegate this authority to the board, giving up a certain de-
gree of individual rights and privileges of ownership which are volunta-
rily subordinated in order to achieve these ends.1 50 The collective
interest of the unit owners is not separable from the interests of individ-
ual unit owners who make up the association. Therefore, the usurpation
of the board's authority by the courts does not serve anyone's interests.
A court's influence is injurious to the association because the board's de-
cisions are questioned and delayed. The advantage to an individual who
may benefit from a court's interference is small compared to the overall
harm done.
Perhaps the fundamental reason for the failure of the reasonableness
tests is that a community association is primarily a corporation. The
assumption of the reasonableness tests is that the association should be
considered in the light of real property law or constitutional law.
Although the association does have characteristics of real property and
government, it is nonetheless primarily organized as a corporation with
specific corporate duties. The principles of corporate law are therefore
148. Park Redlands Covenant Control Comm. v. Simon, 181 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100-01, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 199, 207 (1986) (Kaufman, J., concurring).
149. See Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974).
150. Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
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the proper standards to measure the actions of the community associa-
tion board.
In sharp contrast to the failure of the equitable and constitutional
reasonableness tests, the balance of the individual and collective interest
is achieved by the business judgment doctrine. The business judgment
doctrine is a tool of judicial review whereby the court will not scrutinize
a decision of a corporation's board unless the challenger of the decision
first demonstrates that some breach of the directors' fiduciary duty to the
corporation or its stockholders has occurred.' 5' Thus, the business deci-
sions and the authority of the board to run the corporation are protected
from superfluous and indiscriminate challenge while, at the same time,
there is an opportunity for a review of any truly improper decision. 5 2
III. AN ASSIMILATED STANDARD OF REVIEW
The business judgment doctrine adequately balances the association
members' collective interests against the members' individual interests.
However, there is a significant problem in applying the business judg-
ment doctrine, which was formulated in the context of the law of com-
mercial corporate entities, to community associations which involve non-
commercial forms of disputes.
The business judgment doctrine is well-suited to commercial enter-
prises. The emphasis is on avoiding financial self-dealing and profiteer-
ing at the expense of the corporation and the stockholders. 53 The
difficulty of applying the business judgment doctrine to a not-for-profit
residential association may account for the failure by the courts univer-
sally to embrace the concept, since the doctrine is otherwise promis-
ing.' 54 Nevertheless, it is possible to identify noncommercial fiduciary
responsibilities.
This section will attempt to assimilate the law of corporate fiduciary
151. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
152. In many respects the business judgment doctrine operates to protect a corporate decision in
the way that arbitration protects a private judicial decision. Arbitration is the process of voluntarily
submitting a dispute to an impartial person for his decision. Once decided, there is no appeal unless
the arbitrator acted fraudulently or improperly. C. WEHRINGER, ARBITRATION PRECEPTS AND
PRINCIPLES 1 (1969). The purpose of arbitration is to have the parties agree in advance that the
arbitrator's decision will be final and binding. Id. at 3. The arbitrator is impartial and especially
learned in the particular field of dispute. Id. at 10-11. Arbitration is expeditiously and accurately
carried out. If the court were to re-open an arbitration and second-guess the arbitrator's decision,
the very purpose of arbitration would be undermined. Likewise, the business judgment doctrine
attempts to limit the court's interference with the operation of a corporation while retaining some
ability to correct wrongs.
153. See generally D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 82, at 47-71.
154. See Note, supra note 24, at 666.
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duty with the interests of community association members underlying
the reasonableness tests and as applied by the courts. In this way, a non-
interventionist standard of judicial review will emerge, whereby the
courts could refrain from disrupting the decisions of an association while
maintaining protection of individual members from the malicious or ty-
rannical actions of the majority.
The courts clearly recognize that community association board
members owe a fiduciary duty to the members of the association. 155 The
meaning of this duty, however, is ambiguous. Basically, it is necessary to
determine where the duty of loyalty lies and what interests the law will
protect from abuse of the power entrusted to the board.
Loyalty is one of the central themes of fiduciary duty.' 5 6 Loyalty
may be defined as "the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion
of a person to a cause." 157 The acts of the loyal person must follow from
his own impulses; he must be guided by the cause in determining his
actions. 158 Fiduciary duty does not permit subjective considerations to
cloud the essential requirement to act for the benefit of the cause. The
law of fiduciary duty, then, is primarily concerned with protection from
abuse of power without undermining that power.
There are two basic features of the fiduciary relationship: the fiduci-
ary acts as a substitute for the entrustor, for the entrustor's benefit; and
the entrustor delegates to the fiduciary power to act effectively in the
performance of the fiduciary's duties. 15 9 The central problem of the fidu-
ciary relationship is the potential for abuse of power inherent in its struc-
ture. The fiduciary can only act effectively for the entrustor's benefit if
he possesses power, but at the same time this very possession of power
creates the risk that the fiduciary will use the power to the entrustor's
155. Wolinsky v. Kadison, 114 Il1. App. 3d 527, 533, 449 N.E.2d 151, 157 (1983); Thanasoulis v.
Winston Tower 200 Ass'n, 214 N.J. Super. 408, 411, 519 A.2d 911, 912 (1986), rev'd, 110 N.J. 650,
542 A.2d 900 (1988).
156. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra, note 82, at 71-105.
157. J. ROYCE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY 16-17 (1924).
A man is loyal when, first, he has some cause to which he is loyal; when, secondly, he
willingly and thoroughly devotes himself to this cause; and when, thirdly, he expresses his
devotion in some sustained and practical way, by acting steadily in the service of his cause.
Instances of loyalty are: The devotion of a particular patriot to his country, when this
devotion leads him actually to live and perhaps to die for his country; the devotion of a
martyr to his religion; the devotion of a ship's captain to the requirements of his office
when, after a disaster, he works steadily for his ship and for the saving of his ship's com-
pany until the last possible service is accomplished, so that he is the last man to leave the
ship, and is ready if need be to go down with his ship.
Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
158. Id. at 18.
159. Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 808-09 (1983).
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detriment. 160
The law regulates fiduciaries by imposing on them a high standard
of morality, while at the same time permitting freedom of discretion.
Although the fiduciary must be loyal to the entrustor,' 61 and the fiduci-
ary is obligated by law to act in an altruistic manner, 62 at the same time
the law must encourage prospective fiduciaries to be willing to serve be-
cause a fiduciary position is purely voluntary. Therefore, the law must
not impede the ability of the fiduciary to carry out his duties and must
not burden the fiduciary with excessive interference and liability. 63 To
do this, the law applies the concept of business judgment. If the corpo-
rate fiduciary is exercising business judgment, the court will not interfere
unless there is evidence that the fiduciary has breached his duty of loy-
alty. The difficult question in terms of community associations is how
the courts can define the breach.
In terms of financial transactions, the specific behavior of a fiduciary
who violates the moral obligation to serve and treat the entrustor's inter-
ests is easily identified and understood. When a fiduciary takes an oppor-
tunity for economic enrichment for himself at the expense of the
entrustor's financial condition, there is a measurable, understandable,
and unquestionable offense. In the economic sense, bad faith could be
generally defined as an illegitimate method of competing for scarce re-
sources. 164 An illegitimate means of competing is one that is inconsistent
with the established rules of behavior. 165 All may compete for resources
in the market by bargaining, advertising, and innovating, but not by
force, fraud, corruption or unfair competition. Bad faith arises when the
individual is tempted by an opportunity to obtain a greater share of re-
sources by unauthorized means rather than by established rules for allo-
cating resources. 166
160. Id. at 809. It is this risk of abuse of power that characterizes the fiduciary relationship, and
thus triggers the safeguards of fiduciary law.
161. Id. at 830.
162. Id. Unlike the self-interest norm of the marketplace morality of contract law, the fiduciary
is required by law to prefer the interests of another above his own.
163. Id. at 833-36. The fiduciary relationship must be protected and encouraged because of its
value to society. It enables the transfer of resources by many persons to a small number of experts.
Risk is shifted from individuals to larger groups and creates the means of accomplishing projects
that are not possible with the limited resources of individuals. Id. at 804. Examples of this are the
pooling of individual resources accomplished by financial institutions, and the management speciali-
zation of large public corporations.
164. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L.
REv. 738, 741-42 (1978).
165. Id. Since resources are limited, society must develop rules and mechanisms for the distribu-
tion and allocation of resources to individuals. Otherwise, each person would attempt to acquire and
maintain as much wealth as possible using any means available, including force.
166. Id. See generally Scott, The Fiduciary Principles, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 539 (1949).
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The established rules of behavior are based on fairness. 67 One's
sense of fairness is especially offended when a fiduciary acts in bad faith
because the fiduciary has induced the cooperation of the entrustor and
then taken advantage of the other's reliance. 168 In addition, there is a
sense of diminished efficiency. The fiduciary relationship is a necessary
one for society because specialization requires that we entrust our affairs
to others.169 Bad faith in such relationships disrupts society because it
increases the cost and discourages the use of the fiduciary mechanism.170
The basic principles of corporate fiduciary duty have now been iden-
tified: 1) the fiduciary must be loyal to the entrustor and act in good
faith on behalf of the entrustor-good faith is acting for the benefit of the
entrustor, for no other purpose, and without regard to any subjective
considerations; 2) bad faith is acting for a purpose other than the inter-
ests of the entrustor, such that the act could be considered illegitimate
and thereby diminish the efficiency of the fiduciary mechanism; and 3)
the law must enforce the obligation to act in good faith without under-
mining the discretion of the fiduciary. Both a fiduciary's act of bad faith
and a court's interference with the discretion of the fiduciary in policing
the relationship destroy the foundation of the fiduciary system which ex-
ists because of the necessity for giving broad discretion to the fiduciary.
Application of these principles to community associations requires
identification of the interest that the board is created to serve so that a
definition of bad faith in the context of a community association may be
formulated. The board owes its duty of loyalty to the cause of the associ-
ation. This duty is to maintain and conserve the development with a
view toward enhancing the value and desirability of the property, for the
benefit of all its members. To the extent that a board acts in the best
interests of the association to serve the purposes of the association, the
act is taken in good faith, even if the result would be to harm the interests
of an individual member. To the extent, however, that a board acts to
serve any other purpose, the act is taken in bad faith.
The interests of the association have been identified by the courts in
the cases in which the reasonableness tests are applied. It thus is possible
167. See Anderson, supra note 164, at 746.
168. Id. This sense of fairness is essentially an intuitive understanding that cheating by a fiduci-
ary is particularly disturbing.
169. See generally J. ROYCE, supra note 157, at 140-41.
170. Anderson, supra note 164, at 747. Efficiency of society would be undermined if individuals
were forced to forego specialization because of the fear of cheating. In order to maintain specializa-
tion, society has to bear the increased costs of transactions created by the allocation of resources for
the prevention and detection of cheating.
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to assimilate the interests identified by the reasonableness tests with the
concepts of fiduciary duty in the business judgment doctrine.
The central interests of the members would be correlated with the
elements of the business judgment doctrine: a business decision, disinter-
estedness and good faith, an informed decision, and a rational business
purpose. 7 1
The first element, a business decision, is straight forward. The
board is the governing board of the association with broad authority to
regulate the association. 72 The business of the association is the man-
agement and administration of the property on behalf of its members. 173
The second element, disinterestedness and good faith, is not as easily dis-
cernible. Self-dealing or bad faith, in the context of a community associ-
ation, would involve action that does not serve the health, happiness and
enjoyment of life of the unit owners. 174 This is a broad interest, however,
and it is arguable that every restriction promulgated by an association
would serve the majority's happiness and enjoyment of life. 17 But it is
possible for a board to devise a use restriction that would have no legiti-
mate relationship to the owner's happiness and welfare. For example, a
prohibition of certain models of automobiles on the property or a regula-
tion detailing the requirements for the interior decorating of a unit could
be struck down by the courts as having no conceivable legitimate relation
to the community's welfare. Another example of bad faith use restric-
tions might be a rule singling out an individual or classes of individuals in
the association for the purpose of harassment or improper discrimina-
tion. 176 Finally, a failure to give the unit owners adequate notice of the
restriction or to follow due process would be in bad faith.177 The third
element, an informed decision, correlates with the notion that rules will
not be enforced if they are arbitrary and capricious. 178 In considering a
rule, a board must review all of the facts and circumstances, consider the
alternatives, call a meeting of the owners, if necessary, and weigh the
opinions of the owners. 179 The board should have a record of delibera-
171. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
172. Johnson v. Hobson, 505 A.2d 1313, 1317 (D.C. 1986).
173. Id. at 1319.
174. Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
175. Johnson, 505 A.2d at 1318 n.8.
176. See White Egret Condominium v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 351 (Fla. 1980); see also Le
Febvre v. Osterndorf, 87 Wis. 2d 525, 533, 275 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Ct. App. 1979).
177. See Juno by the Sea North Condominium Ass'n v. Manfredonia, 397 So. 2d 297, 304 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Breene v. Plaza Tower Ass'n, 310 N.W.2d 730, 734 (N.D. 1981).
178. See Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977).
179. See id.
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tion to support the use restriction which reflects a reasonable effort to
consider all relevant information. Otherwise, the decision will not be
protected from judicial review.180
Finally, the decision must involve a rational business purpose, or in
other words, be within the scope of authority of the board. Strict compli-
ance with the statutory requirements of the provisions of the associa-
tion's declaration and bylaws has been deemed an essential requirement
for use restrictions.1 81 The corporate business judgment doctrine, then,
can be applied to community association use restrictions by correlating
the elements of the doctrine with the interests of the association's mem-
bers, as identified in the reasonableness cases. The law of corporate fidu-
ciary duty recognizes the importance of the fiduciary mechanism. The
court must not undermine the discretion of the fiduciary or else the
whole purpose of the relationship is defeated. The law accomplishes this
by placing the burden on the challenger of a fiduciary's actions to demon-
strate a breach of fiduciary duty before it will review the case.
In the context of a community association, the challenger of a use
restriction would have to demonstrate a breach of the fiduciary duty of
the board by showing either that the board acted in a manner that did
not serve the owners' health, happiness and enjoyment of life, or singled
out a class of individuals for injurious treatment, or failed to provide
notice of the restriction, or arrived at the restriction without properly
considering all of the relevant facts, or acted outside the scope of the
board's authority. Unless the challenger first demonstrates one of these
breaches of the board's fiduciary duty to the owners, as identified herein,
the court would not review the decision and would leave the board's de-
cision intact. The legitimate operation of the association would then not
be hampered. For an example of how the assimilated business judgment
doctrine would operate to protect both the association and the individual
members, a hypothetical case can be analyzed. A common use restric-
tion is the prohibition against keeping of household pets or other animals
in the unit. Perhaps the rules prohibit dogs weighing more than twenty
pounds from being on the property. When a unit owner's Saint Bernard
puppy grows up, the association would be suddenly found with a viola-
tion of its rules.
A challenge of the rule in a court applying the reasonableness tests
would probably result in an analysis of how the use restriction came
180. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 82, at 17-18.
181. See Beachwood Villas Condominium v. Poor, 448 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Wolinsky v. Kadison, 114 Ill. App. 3d 527, 534, 449 N.E.2d 151, 157 (1983).
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about, the rationale and purpose of the prohibition, whether the owner
had proper notice, and whether all of the procedures were followed and
documented. Then, depending on the disposition of the court, the court
could find either that the imposition of the dog restriction bears no rea-
sonable relationship to the health, safety and welfare of the owners, or
that prohibiting large dogs indeed protects the health, safety and welfare
of the owners. The fact that the board was acting in good faith to carry
out its mandate would not be an issue.
On the other hand, a challenge of the rule in a court applying the
business judgment doctrine would preliminarily only analyze whether or
not the board acted in good faith. If so, the rule would undergo no fur-
ther scrutiny and the purpose of the board, which is to make such deci-
sions, would not be undermined. If the court finds that the board did not
act in good faith, then the court would appropriately weigh all of the
factors and properly substitute its judgment for the board's discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The reasonableness standards used to scrutinize community associa-
tion use restrictions correctly identify the interest of the association's
members, but fail to protect these interests. Instead, the court replaces
the board's discretion with its own, so that a situation of judicial second-
guessing is established. The interests of the owners, individually and col-
lectively, would be served by a refusal by the courts to review board use
restrictions unless it is first shown that the restrictions violate the fiduci-
ary duty owed by the board to the owners. By assimilating the interests
identified by the reasonableness standards with the business judgment
doctrine's mechanism to protect the decision of the board, the court can
protect both the association's purposes for a stable and efficiently oper-
ated development and the individual owner's interest in not being un-
fairly or oppressively treated by the majority.
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